High on the Tibetan Plateau, the Yarlung Tsangpo River roars through the world’s deepest canyon, plunging nearly 8,000 metres (26,250ft) before crossing into India as the Brahmaputra.
For centuries, this river has been a lifeline for the millions living downstream. But now, a US$137 billion hydropower project – the largest of its kind ever attempted – threatens to turn its waters into a new front in the rivalry between China and India.
Approved last month by Beijing, the project is poised to dwarf the massive Three Gorges Dam in scale, generating three times as much power. But this engineering marvel also represents a new, more insidious battleground: water.
Analysts warn that while the project may not provoke immediate conflict, it lays the groundwork for a contentious new chapter in a relationship already defined by mistrust, border clashes and competing regional ambitions.
“The real challenge for New Delhi and Beijing lies in preventing this issue from becoming another flashpoint in the relationship,” said Shibani Mehta, a senior research analyst with the Carnegie India think tank’s security studies programme.
But border tensions are the bigger issue colouring every other aspect of ties, according to Srikanth Kondapalli, a professor of China studies at India’s Jawaharlal Nehru University and dean of its School of International Studies. “No progress on de-escalation in the border areas means no improvement in bilateral relations,” he told This Week in Asia.
‘In Beijing’s hands’
Beijing’s planned dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo, first announced in 2020, is a marvel of ambition. The 1 trillion-yuan (US$137-billion) project aims to harness the river’s immense hydropower potential as it descends from the Tibetan Plateau, generating more than 300 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually, according to Chinese estimates – enough to power 300 million homes. But its sheer scale is matched only by the anxieties it has unleashed downstream.
For India, which depends on the Brahmaputra for agriculture, hydropower and drinking water, the dam represents a stark reminder of its downstream vulnerability. Without a water-sharing treaty between the two nations, India fears that Beijing could one day weaponise its control of the river in times of conflict.
“China is the upper riparian nation, and it is definitely exploiting that position in this case,” said Gunjan Singh, an associate professor at O.P. Jindal Global University specialising in China-South Asia relations. She pointed to Beijing’s reluctance to share hydrological data, a long-standing frustration for Delhi that has already caused disruptions in flood management and agriculture.
The dam project also raises older concerns that China will, “at worst, use water as a tool in its relations with Delhi, and, at best, disregard Indian interests in the management of Himalayan rivers”, according to Ivan Lidarev, a security analyst specialising in the international relations of India and China.
“India’s position of weakness on this issue is yet another reason [for concern],” he added. “While India resents Chinese dam building, it can do very little to stop it because China, as the upstream country, holds all the cards.”
The announcement of the dam came at a delicate moment. Just months earlier, India and China had reached a rare agreement to disengage troops along their disputed Himalayan border, a move aimed at easing ratcheted-up tensions stemming from deadly clashes that erupted in 2020. But Beijing’s approval of the dam, along with the creation of two new counties in the disputed Aksai Chin region, has reignited concerns that China is doubling down on its aggressive posture.
“Both of these events do not go hand in hand,” Kondapalli said. “The ball is in Beijing’s hands to improve bilateral relations.”
